Neither Migration nor Development:  
The Contradictions of French Co-development Policy

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Abstract

Co-development is based on the idea that migrants contribute to the development of both their host and origin countries, and that public authorities should aim to maximize the positive effects of migration by spurring the financial and human capital gains associated with international population movements. Against this background, French co-development policy, mainly oriented towards African countries, rests on three main thrusts: productive investment, brain circulation, and immigrant return. Yet, a detailed analysis shows that there is a discrepancy between announced objectives and actual means. As a result, the impact of co-development on African countries is very limited since it is more designed according to France’s interests rather than actual recipient countries’ benefits. Furthermore, it appears that co-development, in its current conception, is not easily compatible with French immigration policy, since it is difficult to maximize the impact of migration while trying to restrict entries.

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The notion of co-development keeps migrants at a distance by allocating them a space, namely the development of their village, and by forbidding them other spaces, such as citizenship in their host society and accumulation in the global economy. It “indigenizes” Africa: it will be referred to co-development in the case of the Malian emigrant in France, but not of the French expatriate in the United States.

Bayart (2007: 26)

Introduction

Reflections on co-development are based on the idea that even though “France cannot receive all the misery of the world”, as the former socialist Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, put it at the beginning of the 1990s, it is not possible either to “deter the sea with the arms”, according to the expression of the former President of Senegal, Abdou Diouf. In other words, as long as the poorest inhabitants of the planet cannot see a glimmer of hope in their socio-economic horizon, they will be strongly inclined to migrate to rich nations, no matter the administrative or physical barriers. This is the reason why industrialized countries should adopt responsible migration policies that allow them, on the one hand, to attract the foreign labor they need, without this meaning a massive human capital outflow in countries of origin, and on the other, to control population inflows without violating the fundamental rights of would-be immigrants. In addition, co-development implies that the most efficient way to durably reduce migration pressures lies on credible and sustainable development policies.

Beyond theory, co-development has to deal with practical problems related to the fact that migration policies in OECD countries are more and more restrictive. In such circumstances, how to conduct policies based on the positive role of migration when, at the same time, there is a growing trend to close borders? As a matter of fact, most co-development policies do not succeed in overcoming such contradiction and eventually materialize in migration restrictions and return programs. Even though the measures adopted within the framework of co-development often contribute to improving the economic situation of migrants, their families and their communities, the miracle cure for combining the interests, sometimes contradictory, between industrialized and developing countries has not been found yet.
This paper shows that even though French co-development policy is designed to finance productive investment projects aiming to promote local development in migrants’ communities, it also presents some inconsistencies that do not contribute to making international migration an effective long-term development tool. In this respect, the first section introduces the theoretical framework of co-development and emphasizes the role of the State in such a framework. The second section shows the evolution of French co-development policy, and puts forward its three main thrusts: productive investment, brain circulation, and immigrant return. The third section confronts the rhetoric on co-development to reality. It notably shows that there is a discrepancy between announced objectives and actual means, and that France’s interests might be quite distant from actual recipient countries’ benefits. The fourth section insists on the counterproductive effects of co-development measures in Africa, and maintains that such measures seldom reach their objectives. The fifth section underlines the contradictions between co-development and more and more restrictive immigration policies, and suggests that the most consistent way to strengthen the link between migration and development is through freer labor mobility.

I. Co-development Policies, or How to Link Migration and Development

It was during the “Conference on co-development”, that was held in 1985 at the University of Leuven in Belgium, that the notion of co-development appeared for the first time. The key idea was to give a new direction to international cooperation programs, and to move from the logic of official development assistance, according to which northern countries set the measures they deem necessary for the development of the South, to the logic of shared management of resources and responsibilities (Malgessini, 2001). Therefore, co-development aims to restore the balance in North-South relations, and intend to make Third World countries protagonists of development policies, both in their definition and implementation. In the context of interdependence, co-development implies that economic, social and environmental problems in the South may turn into a burden for other countries, while the improvement in living conditions in developing countries has positive repercussions on the international community. Therefore, industrialized countries have a direct interest in the development of the poorest nations in the world, and such interest is manifest in terms of migration flows. Indeed, the lack of economic opportunities in a number of developing countries, associated with strong social and political tensions, constitutes the determining factor of the decision to move. Besides, migrants often represent the main source of financial and human capital transfers for countries of origin, thus compensating for insertion problems in the world.
economy as well as deficiencies in international cooperation. It was hence logical that reflections on co-development focus on migration issues, converting them in their main thrust.

It was not until 1997, when Sami Naïr was appointed adviser for integration and co-development issues to the Ministry of the Interior and wrote his report on the co-development policy related with migration flows (Naïr, 1997), that international migration began to be regularly associated with the concept of co-development. The idea is that an efficient administration of international movements should help maximize the impact of migration on development, at the same time that development should contribute, in the shorter or longer term, to reducing emigration pressures in Third World countries. Therefore, co-development tries to combine migration and development policies by coupling the action of public authorities with the intervention of other institutional actors both in receiving and sending countries, namely non-governmental organizations, private companies or education centers.

Such alliances aim to exploit potential synergies between migrants, civil society and State in order to maximize the benefits associated with migration flows, but also to minimize the costs that come with them. Emigration countries would then tend to trade off brain drain costs against remittance benefits, while in receiving countries, immigration will only be accepted provided that local population does not perceive the presence of foreign workers as a threat, both in terms of labor market competition and cohabitation within the society. Now, the rise of unemployment during the 1970s and 1980s in most industrialized countries, the parallel increase in immigrant admissions within the framework of family reunification programs, and the lack of determination and coherence in integration policies have made the situation sometimes explosive and have led to a gradual rejection of immigration, with the result that migration policies are getting more and more restrictive. It is in this perspective that it is advisable to analyze the notion of co-development.

The original proposal of Naïr (1997) actually tries to answer a public policy dilemma: how to deal with the labor shortage faced by several sectors of the French economy while limiting the access of foreign-born population to the labor market? To that effect, Nair’s strategy rests on two pillars: the control of migration flows and temporary movements. Settled immigrants should benefit from increased means to speed up their integration into the host society or be encouraged to return to their origin country through the implementation of specific programs. Newcomers, as for them, are destined to go back once their mission is completed, which implies the drawing up of partnership agreements with some developing countries in order to organize temporary flows. Such strategy also aims to promote the development of the countries of origin, since return policies, in particular when oriented towards skilled workers, and temporary migration have as their goal avoiding massive population outflows in southern countries, while allowing them to benefit from the positive effects
of emigration. A better integration of immigrants into the host country also presents advantages for the origin country since it increases their ability to get involved in actions in favor of the development of their communities, in particular through immigrant associations.

In such a scheme, the State plays a key role: first, because it defines and applies migration policy orientations; then, because it negotiates and adopts partnership agreements with developing countries; last, because it organizes and coordinates the action of other co-development actors. Thus, migrant associations represent a real support for fellow countrymen at a loss in the receiving country as well as for origin communities that benefit from their contribution in terms of social and education investments. These associations often serve as an interface between the States of host and origin countries, and immigrant families, reason why a coherent co-development policy should rest on such networks. In order to go beyond a simple logic of assistance, private firms are also meant to be in the heart of the system. In the first place, immigrants can contribute to the productive development of their countries, either through investments from the host country or going back and creating their own enterprises. In the second place, French firms might be interested in investing in the origin country and taking advantage of the market knowledge that immigrants possess. In the third place, education institutions, and first of all universities, contribute to the formation of transnational brains and should, as such, be directly involved, according to Naïr’s view, in a co-development strategy.

II. A Strategy under Construction

The institutional bases of French co-development were set up, as seen previously, when Sami Naïr joined, in 1997, the Ministry of the Interior as an adviser for integration and co-development issues and was then appointed, in 1998, interministerial delegate for co-development and international migration. Afterwards, the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID – Comité Interministériel pour la Coopération Internationale et le Développement) decided to put the emphasis, during its meeting of December 2002, on the links between development aid and international migration and suggested to appoint an ambassador for co-development, in charge of designing the co-development strategy and coordinating related programs. But it was only after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President that co-development really found its place in the heart of the governmental action with the creation, in May 2007, of the
Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development.¹ Such initiative, which raised many debates during the 2007 presidential campaign, is symptomatic of President Sarkozy’s will, on the one hand, to acknowledge the fact that France has a growing need for economic migrants and, on the other hand, to drastically reduce non-economic migration and to firmly fight against unauthorized immigration. Brice Hortefeux was in charge of this Ministry from its creation to January 2009. He was then replaced by Eric Besson.

French co-development strategy is based on three main thrusts: productive investment, brain circulation and immigrant return. Thus, the Migration and Economic Initiatives Program (PMIE – Programme Migrations et Initiatives Économiques), implemented in 2001, is devoted to encourage productive investment in different African countries. An immigrant in France can contribute to the financing of a project launched by a friend or a relative stayed at home by using part of her savings as a bank guarantee. Besides, the program brings technical support to entrepreneurs, initially through a feasibility study, then by following the project during its first year. It is also noteworthy that PMIE advises immigrants willing to invest in France by enabling them to set up their project and to find funding, or by offering specific formation. Between 20 and 30 projects are financed each year by the program, and around one third of them (six to ten) materialize in an actual business (Besson, 2008).

As a complement to the PMIE strategy, French authorities intend to spur remittances and immigrants’ savings, both considered essential to maximize the potential of the co-development strategy (Bourven, 2008). Co-development savings accounts (Comptes épargne codéveloppement), created in 2006, and running since January 2009, aim to stimulate immigrant savings in order to channel them into productive investment in countries of origin. Interests are freely determined by each bank, and depositors benefit from a tax exemption of 40% of the savings, up to 20,000 euros. Fund withdrawals are only permitted to finance development projects in the origin country. Although such device seems appealing, it has to be noted that it is only available at the Union tunisienne de banques.

In addition, French government also decided to help immigrants find the cheapest way to send remittances to their families by creating the Observatory of remittance costs (Observatoire des coûts d’envoi d’argent à l’étranger). On its public website (www.envoidargent.fr), the observatory compares the costs of sending remittances through several financial institutions to, so far, 16 developing countries, 13 of them in Africa. The underlying idea is that as long as information on remittance costs is difficult to collect, money remitters do not have incentives to lower transaction

¹ The latter term was eventually replaced, during the cabinet reshuffle of March 2008, by “mutually-supportive development” (développement solidaire).
costs. By easing the access to information, the Observatory is supposed to promote competition between financial intermediaries, which eventually should bring about a drop in the cost of sending money home, hence an increase in opportunities to invest in productive projects.

Brain circulation, as for it, is organized around the TOKTEN program (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals). Launched by United Nations in Turkey in 1977, this initiative allows qualified expatriates to return for some weeks or months in their countries of origin in order to use their skills in service of the community. Compared with more traditional programs of cooperation, TOKTEN has the advantage of relying on professionals that perfectly know the language and the culture of the country, and therefore contribute to a better transfer. Within this framework, and in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), France invests in higher education in Africa by financing missions made up of scientists and academics who give courses and take part in different research projects.

“Skills and talents” permits (Cartes “compétences et talents”) seek to promote international mobility of highly skilled workers. Adopted by the law of July 24, 2006, this new residence permit applies to people willing and able to contribute to the development and influence of France and the origin country in intellectual, scientific, cultural or sports fields. “Skill and talents” permits are valid for three years and renewable once. Two thousands permits should be assigned each year. The purpose of this mechanism is twofold: first, it aims to attract, in the logic of “chosen immigration”, the most talented in their field; second, it tries to strengthen human capital levels in developing countries, since recipients are obliged to return after expiration of their permit. In 2008, 405 permits were granted (Weil, 2009).

Return is a significant objective of French co-development policy but its implementation strongly depends on the skill level of foreign workers. Highly skilled migrants, in particular students, have been given incentives to come to France for many years, and return has not been systematically required, although the recently created “skill and talents” permits precisely put the emphasis on medium-term stays. By contrast, unskilled migrants are strongly encouraged to return to their countries, and several strategies have been designed since the 1970s, when France, hit by the oil crisis, decided to offer money to immigrants who decided to return. However, most foreign workers opted for bringing their families instead of returning to their countries, giving rise to a massive process of family reunification in the 1970s and 1980s.

Today, return policy is coordinated by ANAEM, the National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration (Agence Nationale de l’Accueil des Etrangers et des Migrations), that provides “return and reintegration aids” (Aides au retour et à la réinstallation). These aids are aimed
at two kinds of population. First, “voluntary return aids” are meant for unauthorized immigrants and consist of financial aid (2000 euros for a single adult; 3500 euros for a couple) to return to the origin country. In many cases, “volunteers” do not really have the opportunity to choose. Second, “reintegration aids” enable regular immigrants who want to return to their countries to finance their investment projects up to 7000 euros. They can also benefit from a professional formation as well as technical aid during one year. In Mali, one of the main beneficiaries of the program, the number of firms created thanks to integration aids went up from 36 in 2000 to 152 in 2007. On average, between 2003 and 2007, 126 firms were created every year (Besson, 2008).

The co-development Priority Solidarity Fund (FSP – *Fonds de Solidarité Prioritaire – codéveloppement*) is a specific program for Mali and Senegal. It includes several features of other co-development programs, since its purpose is to help immigrants who want to invest and/or return. In particular, it takes into account NGO initiatives that promote social development, by enabling them to finance local projects. In Mali, 22 projects were financed in 2004-2005, mainly related to education (eight projects) and agriculture (four). The FSP co-development contributed with 620,000 euros, that is, 63% of the total amount (Cambrezy, 2007). Nevertheless, the main focus of the program consists of helping Malian and Senegalese immigrants, through financial assistance, to return to their countries.

The co-development strategy adopted in the last few years rests on ‘Agreements on concerted management of migration flows and co-development’ (*Accords de gestion concertée des flux migratoires et de codéveloppement*) between France and its main partners. In return for their cooperation as regards migration movements and transit, beneficiary countries receive privileged access to the French labor market and are allowed a higher number of temporary visas, notably through the “skills and talents” scheme. Immigrants from these countries can also more easily benefit from return and reintegration aids. The first agreement was signed in September 2006 with Senegal, then joined by Benin, Congo and Gabon in 2007, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Tunisia in 2008, Burkina Faso and Cameroun in 2009. Other developing or emerging countries, some of them outside Africa, like Brazil or Vietnam, are supposed to be progressively added to the list.

It is interesting to note that France has served as a driving force in the building of European co-development policy. In 1999, that is, two years after Nair (1997)’s report, the European Council adopted the Tampere program, which aimed to define a common immigration policy, and referred for the first time to the notion of co-development at the European level. The 2005 European Council, in Hampton Court, intended to define more precisely the instruments of such policy, emphasizing the importance of education in developing countries through a brain circulation process. In 2006, the
Euro-African conference on migration and development, in Rabah, considered the possibility of adopting financial instruments in favor of co-development. Finally, on the initiative of Brice Hortefeux, the French Ministry of Immigration, the 2008 European Council, in Brussels, adopted the “European Pact on Immigration and Asylum”, which explicitly refers to co-development as a tool to involve immigrants in the development of their countries of origin. The main problem, however, is that such international “commitments” have not materialized, so far, in concrete measures, in particular as regards financial instruments. And even in the French case, it has been difficult to translate intentions into action.

III. From Rhetoric to Reality

The analysis of the budget devoted to the French Ministry of Immigration clearly shows that public spending in favor of co-development projects is quite limited compared to other items (Table 1). With 29.5 million euros on average between 2008 and 2010, co-development indeed represented only 5 percent of total credits, as compared to immigration and asylum (75.5%), and integration and access to French citizenship (19.5%). It is however noteworthy that, after the 2009 decrease (-15.7% in total; -15.5% for co-development), the Ministry’s budget for 2010 has significantly increased (+10.6% in total; +42.9% for co-development), and that the share of co-development in total credits has also slightly improved (4.5% in 2008; 5% in 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration, asylum and integration</td>
<td>609.6</td>
<td>513.8</td>
<td>560.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and asylum</td>
<td>414.2</td>
<td>436.0</td>
<td>480.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(staff)</td>
<td>(18.4)</td>
<td>(36.0)</td>
<td>(38.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration and access to French citizenship</td>
<td>195.3</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(staff)</td>
<td>(13.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-development</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>638.6</td>
<td>538.3</td>
<td>595.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: in million euros.
Source: French Ministry of Budget, author’s calculations.

Table 2 puts co-development into the perspective of French official development assistance. With less than one per cent of the total budget, co-development appears as the poor relation of international cooperation. It is particularly striking that the total budget devoted to official
development assistance decreased between 2007 and 2008, precisely when the new Ministry of Immigration was created, and that the increase in the total budget in 2009 (+1.9%) has not benefited co-development (-15.5%). By contrast, the rise in co-development credits in 2010 (+42.9%) has been much higher than the general increase in official development assistance (+11.3%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial and economic aid for development</td>
<td>994.1</td>
<td>984.8</td>
<td>1060.6</td>
<td>1196.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity with developing countries</td>
<td>2126.7</td>
<td>2092.4</td>
<td>2081.4</td>
<td>2292.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-development</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3120.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>3106.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>3166.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>3166.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* in million euros  
*Source:* French Ministry of Budget

The top priority of French authorities consists of fighting immigration, and a huge share of the Ministry of Immigration’s budget is oriented towards this purpose. In 2008, 80 million euros were allocated, as part of the “immigration and asylum” item, to the administration of the Administrative Retention Centers (*Centres de Rétention Administrative*), which host asylum seekers waiting to be regularized or irregular immigrants on the verge of being deported. Actually, the number of deportations increased by 50% between 2005 (19,841) and 2008 (29,796), as a confirmation of the French government’s struggle against unauthorized immigration. However, the fight against immigration does not only focus on irregular immigrants, but also tackles the legal ones. Permanent inflows, after many years of significant increase, have dropped by 5% between 2004 (141,593) and 2006 (135,122). The number of asylum seekers, in particular, went down from 59,768 in 2003 to 30,748 in 2006 (-49%). Likewise, the stock of foreign labor fell by 10% between 2002 (1,624 thousand foreign workers) and 2005 (1,456). President Sarkozy’s will to reach a strict parity between economic and non-economic migration manifests itself in the stiffening of the conditions for family reunification (Weil, 2009). It should also come with a rapid increase in temporary inflows. Since 2000, the proportion of temporary foreign workers has systematically been higher than that of permanent workers, and there is no reason why this trend should reverse, above all in the current context of the global economic crisis (Khoudour-Castéras, 2009).

These efforts to reduce both unauthorized and legal migration have materialized themselves in the “Agreements on concerted management of migration flows and co-development”, which aim
first and foremost to fight migration to the root, that is, in the countries of origin. Such strategy is in keeping with the “externalization” of the migration policy, which consists in transferring the burden of the fight against unauthorized immigration to the countries of origin (Blanchard and Wender, 2007). It also explains why most agreements have been signed with countries considered strategic by the French government, either because they are significant emigration countries, as Congo and Tunisia, or more likely because they have become transit destinations on the road to Europe, as Cape Verde and Mauritania.

Table 3. Main countries of origin of French immigration, 1996-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>102.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>127.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>150.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>102.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>161.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC (ex-Zaire)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>85.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>133.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Figures correspond to the average number of immigrants (in thousands).
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD (2009).

Yet, and paradoxically, co-development main measures do not seem to be directly related to immigration. Among the fifteen top immigration countries during the period 1996-2007 (Table 3), only four of them have signed, so far, an agreement with France: Cameroun, Congo, Senegal and Tunisia. By contrast, such countries as Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire or Morocco, which are among the main sending countries, do not directly benefit from French co-development policy. Conversely, countries that are not really significant in terms of migration movements to France, like Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gabon and Mauritania belong to the “co-development” list. It could then be argued that co-development depends on the income level of African countries. And it is true in the cases of some
of the poorest countries of the continent like Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Senegal, but also Mali, where the co-development Priority Solidarity Fund plays a significant role. But in some other cases, namely Cape Verde, Gabon and Tunisia, whose GDP per capita is above the African average, this explanation does not fit. It does not fit either for most of the countries with poor income levels that do not have any agreement with France in terms of co-development.

This situation seems to indicate that other reasons, hence interests, prevail in the decision of the French government to sign agreements with such or such country. In this respect, the link with former colonies seems to play a significant role. As a matter of fact, Cape Verde is the only recipient country that does not belong to the French area of influence. Now, why not to include the Democratic Republic of Congo, a former Belgian colony, among the co-development partners, since this country is at the same time one of the main immigration countries in France and one of the poorest in Africa? It also appears that geostrategic strategic interests are at stake, as in the case of Gabon, one of the richest countries in the continent and whose emigration levels are relatively low, but where French oil interests are particularly well represented. Finally, as explained previously, the argument of the “externalization” of migration controls is one of the most convincing to understand the map of co-development agreements between France and its African partners. Such strategy corresponds to the will of French authorities to curb the inflow of African irregular immigrants by enabling to create more opportunities in countries of origin, but also by giving incentives to transit countries to effectively fight against the crossing of their borders. As Bayart (2007: 26) puts it, the notion of co-development is: “a wheel of the indirect administration of the Maghreb and Sahel ‘limes’, where Europe externalizes its anti-migration policy in exchange for an ounce of self-interested charity.”

As a matter of fact, co-development measures are designed according to France’s interests, which are often incompatible with those of recipient countries. Migration controls and return policies mainly focus on unskilled labor, when precisely labor markets in African countries do not have the capacity to absorb a population younger and younger, and insufficiently qualified. For these countries, emigration helps to reduce demographic pressures and comes with an increase in remittances, which contribute to fueling consumption, hence GDP. By contrast, the brain drain from Africa to Europe is detrimental to most countries of origin, not only because of the direct loss in terms of human capital, but also because there is a negative externality related to the fact that emigration countries might stop investing in education, since other countries take advantage of this investment. In total, France and African countries compete to attract (in the first case) or retain (in the second) the most qualified workers of the continent, but they equally reject, although not for the
same reasons, unskilled workers. Co-development policies reflect this international reality, and primarily satisfy French interests. As a result, the impact of co-development for recipient countries is not up to expectations.

IV. Counterproductive Effects of Co-development

Even though French co-development policy has strongly evolved in the last few years, and has given rise to myriads of projects trying to link migration and development, public actions remain limited compared to private initiatives. Most development projects are mainly financed by migrants’ associations through collective remittances, while French public investments have difficulty taking off. Associations tend to invest in a more efficient way than public authorities. Daum (2007), for instance, shows that the improvements in education in the Kayes region (Western Mali), from where come most Malian immigrants, are the result of the commitment of several associations of Malians in France. By contrast, projects financed through the Co-development Priority Solidarity Fund have a more limited impact on the community. In this sense, the insistence of French authorities to finance “productive”, that is, job-creating projects, instead of investing in social or educative ones is symptomatic of the use of co-development as a containment policy (Daum, 1998): wells, clinics and schools do not deter people from migrating; jobs are supposed to do it.

In that respect, the number of jobs created through the FSP co-development is around three by project (Besson, 2008). However, Cambrezy (2007) suggests that most of these jobs are not stable, since they correspond to intra-family services. Above all, it is difficult for returnees to support with their small business’ profits as many family members as they did while working abroad. A simple comparison between remittances and official development assistance reveals the limits of a strategy mainly based on migration controls and return aids. In 2006, the whole African continent received 15.4 billion dollars from official remittances as against 9.3 billion dollars from public aid. It is therefore difficult for co-development, which represents a tiny share of official development assistance, to compete with the lure of emigration.

Another problem lies in the procyclical effect of co-development measures. Indeed, public investment is directly related to migrants’ financial contribution. When the French economy is doing well, immigrants tend to benefit from more job opportunities and higher wages. They have then more resources to invest in their countries of origin or to give to migrants’ associations, hence activating the intervention of French co-development institutions. On the contrary, when economic conditions worsen, as it is the case with the current economic crisis, unemployment primarily affects
immigrants, who are less prone to invest, either individually or collectively, in their origin communities, the result being a drop in public investment too. In the same way, the fight against unauthorized immigration, which increases in times of crisis, tends to jeopardize undocumented immigrants, bringing about a slowdown in the financing of collective projects (Gauvrit and Le Bahers, 2004).

The brain circulation policy is another significant example of the counterproductive effects of French co-development, not only for sending countries, but also for France itself. The idea of the new “skills and talents” permit, for instance, is to attract a limited number of high skilled workers for a three-year period, renewable once. But so far, it has not been possible to fulfill the annual objective of 2000 permits. In 2008, only 405 of them were granted (Weil, 2009), in part because of the difficulties of the French administration to adapt to this new system and to communicate on it, but also because France is not the most attractive country for high skilled workers. In the context of growing international competition between industrialized countries to attract foreign brains, and also of decline of the French language, it would be preferable, instead of limiting entries with contingents, to improve immigrants’ situation, not only in terms of visas, but also with regard to wages, working conditions, families' reception and, in a general way, integration into the host society.

Brain drain policies should also take into account the costs in terms of human capital, hence development, for the countries of origin. Even though it is too early to measure the impact of “skills and talents” permits, it is likely that many beneficiaries will find a way to stay longer than initially planned. And it would not serve France’s interests either to send this human capital back to its source. The question that arises then is whether a responsible co-development policy should not offset the loss of skilled labor by increasing investment in education in developing countries. In fact, there are very few countries, France not being the exception, that are really concerned with the long-term effects of brain drain in the South, the best evidence being that it has never been possible to implement the tax proposed by Bhagwati (1977), whose purpose was that high-skilled workers migrating to industrialized nations compensate, through a tax deducted in the host country and transferred to the origin country, for the financial loss represented by public education spending.

As for unskilled labor, co-development policies are mainly oriented towards temporary migration. In France, Provisional work permits (Autorisations provisoires de travail) enable foreigners to fill non-permanent jobs up to nine months. Temporary flows contribute, as put forward by Nair (1997), to satisfying labor demand without having to face integration problems, and help migrants accumulate savings without breaking the link with their families. However, temporary migration
programs also pose problems in terms of working conditions, since many foreign workers do not have access to union representation, either because they think they do not need it, or because there is no culture of unions in their countries, or still because unions themselves see immigrants as competitors for local workers. The upshot is that some employers take advantage to break labor and wage regulations, for instance not paying overtime.

Besides, as underlined by Akers Chacón and Davis (2006), temporary migration represents a way for receiving countries not to assume the integration costs of immigrants and their families, like education, health or housing spending. It is cheaper, both economically and socially, to bring temporary labor and regularly replace it than to allow foreign workers to permanently settle where they work. However, such policy has a cost in terms of human capital, since employers has to recurrently train new workers, when it would be more efficient to keep trained immigrants (OECD, 2008). Because temporary migration implies to be separated from family during several months, the human cost of such strategy is also important. Furthermore, the fact of not working during the other months, owing to the difficulties of the domestic labor market to absorb additional workers, creates problems related to the access to bank credit and social protection.

The French temptation not to integrate new immigrant population manifests itself in its return policy (Weil, 2002). Although financial aids usually come with technical assistance and sometimes training programs, the long-term sustainability of productive projects remains limited, since not all returnees are meant to be entrepreneurs. Besides, return programs do not take into account the fact that in many developing countries, the economic and legal environment does not work in favor of investment (de Haas, 2005). Moreover, return is often considered a failure by migrants and their communities. The fact of living abroad, far from everybody’s eyes, is interpreted as a sign of success. It is possible that migrants have a poorly paid job and live in precarious conditions, but sending money home means, both for them and their families, that they have triumphed. When they return to their countries, they stop being someone important, and their families do not receive remittances anymore. Even when returnees have money and succeed in setting up a micro-business, there are few possibilities of climbing the social ladder, above all in the countries with rigid social structures (Tapinos, 1974). Human capital effects might also be limited, since migrants, even the most qualified, often work in sectors not directly related to their field of expertise, giving rise to a “brain waste” phenomenon (Özden, 2006). When they return to their countries, they cannot put forward their experience abroad to properly insert in the labor market. This is why, after some time, numerous returnees try to migrate again, either because their investment project failed, or because they do not find a job, or still because their situation does not fulfil their economic and social aspirations.
V. Are Co-development and Restrictive Migration Policies Compatible?

Something striking about migration policies – and by extension co-development – is the lack of coherence in decisions. For instance, the argument that labor markets in the North have reached saturation point does not square with economic reality. OECD countries are confronted with a mismatch problem between labor supply and demand: although unemployment rates have reached worrying levels in many countries, among them France, several activity sectors cannot find employees. Mass education has made people reluctant to work in a number of sectors, mostly manual activities. The result is the coexistence of high levels of unemployment and unsatisfied labor demand (Bertosi, 2006). Therefore, the arrival of foreign workers on the domestic market does not constitute the cause of unemployment, but rather the answer to the mismatch problem on the labor market. Such sectors as agriculture, construction, domestic services... take advantage of a migration process that helps to avoid wage pressures. Besides, population ageing in northern countries creates disequilibria not only on labor markets, between supply and demand, but also in the financing of pension systems, between active and inactive population. However, the closing of borders is the easy way out to fulfill the populist interests of a certain number of political leaders. It is indeed easier to make public opinion believe that immigrants are to blame for all the problems in the country than to adopt the necessary reforms to improve the situation. It is also more comfortable to make them scapegoats than to underline the positive role of immigration in receiving societies.

Moreover, the fight against unauthorized immigration poses serious problems in terms of human rights (de Haas, 2007), due to the fact that industrialized countries have developed strategies that bring candidates for migration to endanger their lives. In particular, the walls that separate the United States from Mexico or Spain from Morocco constitute a true death sentence for immigrants (Blanchard and Wender, 2007). Besides, restrictive immigration policies have become a “subsidies” policy for Mafioso networks that grow richer thanks to migrant smuggling. Obviously, nations are sovereign and have the right to protect themselves against unwanted foreign population. But they also should take into account the consequences of their policies. When fighting against unauthorized immigration implies significant human costs, responsible States should at least reconsider the migration issue.

French co-development policy, as many other similar policies worldwide, rests on the illusion that development constitutes the best way to reduce immigration. In such a perspective, an increase in official development assistance should work at the same time in favor of development and
migration reduction (Böhning, 1994). However, experience shows that development aid tends to increase emigration in developing countries, since the improvement in living conditions that usually follows such policies contributes to relieving the financial constraint associated with the decision to migrate (Martin and Taylor, 1996; de Haas, 2007). By contrast, migration flows play a significant role in the international convergence process (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999): the drop in labor supply that comes with emigration brings about an increase in sending countries’ real wages, while higher competition on receiving countries’ labor markets comes with a decrease in real wages. As a result, the international wage gap tends to reduce, hence lowering incentives to migrate.

In the end, it is legitimate to wonder whether the most consistent way to strengthen the link between migration and development would not be by opening borders more widely to foreign workers instead of multiplying initiatives aiming to restrain immigration. The failure of many aid policies should compel global leaders to take up the development challenge by considering new alternatives, and freer labor mobility is one of them. In this regard, it is worth clarifying that freer mobility does not mean “invasion”. It is not because people are free to move that they all do so. Recent history shows that the openness of European borders to southern and eastern countries, contrary to some predictions, has not brought about a massive inflow of new immigrants (Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2005). For sure, there has been an increase in intra-European movements. But nothing that immigration countries could not handle. Would-be migrants are rational agents that are not only attracted by wage differentials but also employment opportunities (Todaro, 1969). If there are not such opportunities, for instance in a period of economic crisis, foreign workers do not come, and in many cases, current immigrants take the decision to return home, at least when they have the guarantee they can migrate again later. In this sense, one of the main reasons why family reunification significantly increased in France after 1975 is related to the closing of borders to economic immigrants. Foreign workers, who knew they could not circulate freely anymore, preferred to bring their families than to go back to their countries. In fact, when there are many hindrances to immigration, those who succeed in going round them are generally not willing to return, even temporary, for fear of not being able to make it again. As a result, strict border controls end up giving rise to more and more illegal immigration. They also imply an increase in public spending related to border surveillance and unauthorized immigrant deportations.

In total, while the notion of co-development emphasizes the positive role of migration in the development of both receiving and sending countries, it has in reality become an anti-immigration strategy. The “Agreements on concerted management of migration flows and co-development” are particularly symptomatic of the trading of development aid for migration controls. Return programs,
as for them, have almost totally substituted for the integration policy. Not exactly what Sami Naïr had devised! In a 2006 interview, he actually criticized French co-development policy, which ‘in reality is used to hide the deportation of illegal immigrants. [...] How do you want that immigrants invest in their countries if they are not sure to have the papers that allow them to have a normal life here? It is necessary to relax migration, to reinject blood, to make people move’ (Naïr, 2006).

Conclusion

Co-development has taken a growing importance in the French scheme of development aid, as confirmed by the 2007 creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development. Initiatives aiming to more closely link migration and development have rapidly spread over the last decade, and a number of co-development projects have materialized in many developing countries, mainly in Africa. The financial and technical assistance given within the framework of the Migration and Economic Initiative Program or the Co-development Solidarity Fund, or through return and reintegration aids, have contributed to the implementation of economic and social projects synonymous with better living conditions. In particular, policies based on the training of migrants and their communities, that is, the improvement of human capital, have reached better results than other programs (Cambrezy, 2007; Gauvrit and Le Bahers, 2004).

But co-development is not the panacea to the Third World’s problems. First, because France, as other OECD countries, raises more and more barriers to entry of foreign labor, hence limiting the development potential of international migration. Second, because the only migration flows really encouraged correspond to skilled labor, which implies a loss of human capital in developing countries. Unless real policies in favor of brain circulation and return are adopted, the costs of brain drain will keep exceeding the benefits of the international transfer of knowledge. Third, because although temporary migration might enable migrants accumulate enough capital to productively invest in their origin communities, they also induce problems in terms of family equilibrium and work stability. Fourth, “voluntary” return programs usually do not correspond to the genuine aspirations of migrants, but rather constitute the most “elegant” way to deport unwanted immigrants without openly clashing with countries of origin.

Even if policies based on migration dynamics can serve as a driving force for local development, they barely represent a viable solution for developing countries’ structural problems, which require deep institutional reforms. In this respect, the co-development policy must overcome its contradictions. First of all, France should acknowledge that it needs not only qualified, but also,
and above all, unskilled foreign labor, in particular to cope with population ageing. It is the role of political leaders to explain the real advantages of immigration instead of playing with public opinion’s fears. It is also essential that international cooperation policies offer to Third World countries the fundamental bases for sustainable development. This supposes that co-development does not only focus on migration flows, but rather on genuine technology transfer policies as well as an effective and fair process of trade liberalization.

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